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Abstract

From the Nation to the People of a Potential New Historical Bloc: Rethinking Popular Sovereignty through Gramsci
Abstract
During the past decades traditional notions of sovereignty have been challenged in Europe. First, we have the
erosion of sovereignty induced by the process of European Integration. Secondly, the new waves of migrants
and refugees arriving in Europe and the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies of ‘Fortress Europe’ and
‘closed borders’ along with the intensification of racism and islamophobia, both as ideological climate but also
as official state policy, have opened up the debate regarding the relation between sovereignty and ethnicity. On
the one hand, any attempt towards a rupture with the embedded and constitutionalised neoliberalism of the
EU in order to initiate processes of social transformation and emancipation, should necessarily take the form
of a reclaiming of popular sovereignty and democratic control over crucial aspects of economic and social
policy. On the other hand, we must deal with the association of sovereignty with nationalism, racism and
colonialism, tragically exemplified in the way the Far Right links the question of sovereignty to its own
authoritarian racist agenda. To deal with these challenges I take a critical position to both neo-Kantian
conceptions of cosmopolitan rights and ‘neo-republican’ defences of the nation-state and the people as
common history and shared values. In contrast I suggest that we rethink the people in a ‘post-nationalist’ and
de-colonial way as the emerging community of all the persons that work, struggle and hope on a particular
territory, as the reflection of the emergence of a potential historical bloc
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From the Nation to the People of a Potential
New Historical Bloc: Rethinking Popular
Sovereignty through Gramsci
Panagiotis Sotiris
Introduction
The very notion of sovereignty and all the political notions
associated with it have been facing a series of important challenges,
especially in Europe. On the one hand we have all the recent
developments in the construction of the European Project and the
entrance to the era of the ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ that
represent an even more aggressive version of the reduced
sovereignty that has been, one way or the other, at the centre of
European Integration from the beginning. The very notion that a
country, such as Greece and to a lesser degree Ireland or Portugal,
can be put under supervision and surveillance, with all major policy
decisions being referred to the endless negotiations with the
European institutions, exemplifies this tendency. From the euro as
a form of ceding of national monetary sovereignty to the Treaties
that give priority to European Institutions and the new
mechanisms of disciplinary supervision of member states’
economies, exemplified in the Greek experience, the European
Integration process has been a process of imposition of a condition
of reduced and limited sovereignty, affecting not only ‘peripheral
countries’ but also countries of the EU core. Moreover, these
developments make sovereignty a particular exigency, in the sense
that any break with austerity and neoliberalism has to take the form
of the exercise of a sovereign collective will over other institutional
constraints, such as the terms of the EU treaties, the role of the
ECB or the financial, monetary and institutional architecture of the
Eurozone.
On the other hand, the new waves of migrants and refugees
arriving in Europe and the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies
of ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘closed borders’ along with the
intensification of racism and Islamophobia, both as ideological
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climate but also as official state policy, have opened up the debate
regarding the relation between sovereignty and ethnicity.
The reaction to the current wave of refugees and migrants from
the entire systemic political spectrum, along with the new versions
of the ‘clash of civilizations’ associated with an antiterrorist policy
that is based even more upon Islamophobia, stress the fact that
questions of identity and ethnicity remain a highly contested terrain
and that we are facing a return to nationalist and racist discourses
and practices. The same goes for the recurring insistence of the Far
Right on a form of sovereignty strongly associated with the nation,
defined in an almost racist way.
Recent developments, such as the British vote in favour of
recuperating the aspects of sovereignty that were ceded as part of
participation in the European Union, and the political and
ideological confrontations surrounding the British debate, before
and after the referendum, also brought forward this challenge.
Without underestimating all the ugly aspects of xenophobia and
racism expressed in parts of the Brexit campaign, it is obvious that
important segments of the working class and other subaltern
classes saw in the reclaiming of sovereignty a way out of austerity,
lack of democracy, lack of control over their lives.1
At the same time, in contemporary debates in the Left one can
see the tension between different positions but also the tension
inside each position. For example, the supporters of the position
that any attempt to establish social and political rights for those
who fall outside the limits of the nation necessarily implies some
form of transnational polity have to face the fact that
contemporary transnational institutions such as the EU in fact not
only are instrumental in establishing new forms of exclusion (such
as increased barriers on refugees and migrants and in general non
‘EU-nationals’), but also play an important part in the erosion of
any possibility of democratically opting for policies representing
the collective interests of the subaltern classes.2 At the same time,
those who support some form of reclaiming sovereignty as part of
an attempt to re-establish democracy in opposition to neoliberalism
1

For a detailed analysis of the different dynamics inside the Leave vote in the British
Referendum see Watkins 2016.
2
This was exemplified in Jean Claude-Juncker’s statement that “there can be no choice
against European treaties” (Sudais 2015).
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have to face the fact that any return to a traditional ‘national’
definition of the collective political body of democracy will lead to
various forms of exclusion.
So the question I will try to deal with in this text, albeit in a
rather schematic way, is whether it is possible to articulate the
demand to reclaim sovereignty as part of a democratic and
emancipative project on the part of the subaltern classes, which will
take account of the fact of mass migration and mass refugee
movements and avoid falling into the pitfalls of varieties of
nationalism, exclusion and even state-sanctioned racism. But first
we must see the answers that have been offered so far.
1. The limits of neo-Kantian cosmopolitanism
One is what we might call the Neo-Kantian answer. Kant (1795)
formulated his conception of cosmopolitan rights in his text on
perpetual peace when he suggested three interconnected principles
in order to attain peace in the new international landscape that was
formed by the emergence of the nation-State: a) that the civil
constitution of every state must be republican; b) that the rights of
nations shall be based on a federation of free states; and c) that the
cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal
hospitality. As many commentators have already noted,3 one can
already see here the expression of tensions that we also see today,
such as the tension between the nation-State and a universal form
of rights, leading to Kant substituting the fully cosmopolitan right,
namely a global form of full political rights, with a right of
hospitality. We also know, both from historical experience and
from writings such as Hannah Arendt’s, how the contemporary
international law on migrants and refugees was formed after the
experience of big masses of stateless populations in the first half of
the twentieth century and the emergence as a political and juridical
question of the “right to have rights”.
Man of the twentieth century has become just as emancipated from nature
as eighteenth-century man was from history. History and nature have become
equally alien to us, namely, in the sense that the essence of man can no longer
be comprehended in terms of either category. On the other hand, humanity,
3

See for example Benhabib 2004.
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which for the eighteenth century, in Kantian terminology, was no more than a
regulative idea, has today become an inescapable fact. This new situation, in
which “humanity” has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature
or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right
of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity
itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible. For, contrary to the
best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to obtain new declarations of human
rights from international organizations, it should be understood that this idea
transcends the present sphere of international law which still operates in terms
of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states; and, for the
time being, a sphere that is above the nations does not exist. (Arendt 1958, p.
298)

Today, the neo-Kantian perspective mainly takes the form of an
increased emphasis on the emergence of institutional forms of
transnational political cooperation and the potential creation of
elements of a global political cooperative and even federative form
that would guarantee the universal character of basic human rights
and exactly guarantee the “right to have rights”.
Jürgen Habermas’ propositions regarding the emergence of a
postnational configuration presents exactly this tendency.
Naturally, Habermas is well aware of the neoliberal and
undemocratic character of the actual construction of European
Union, yet he sees it as the only way to actually create a
postnational political form that would guarantee rights and
reinstate the welfare state, provided that there is an enhancement
of democratic procedures and forms of postnational political
education. Habermas’ suggestion that it is possible as part of the
process of European Integration to see the emergence of
democratic forms at the European level that could foster the
development of a cosmopolitan consciousness and forms of truly
global citizenship is based upon his particular conception of
democracy itself. Democracy is not the exercise of a collective
popular will, but rather a complex series of deliberative processes
as communicative practices that enhance the emergence of more
rational forms:
Today, the public sovereignty of the people has withdrawn into legally
institutionalized procedures and the informal, more or less discursive
opinion- and will-formation made possible by basic rights. I am assuming
here a network of different communicative forms, which, however, must be
organized in such a way that one can presume they bind public
55
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administration to rational premises. In so doing, they also impose social and
ecological limits on the economic system, yet without impinging on its inner
logic. This provides a model of deliberative politics. This model no longer
starts with the macrosubject of a communal whole but with anonymously
intermeshing discourses. (Habermas 1996, p. 505)

Then democracy at the European level does not imply the
emergence of a European people or demos (as collective will and
identity) but rather the intensification of these processes of
deliberation in all their complexity.
The European market will set in motion a greater horizontal mobility and
multiply the contacts among members of different nationalities. In addition to
this, immigration from Eastern Europe and the poverty-stricken regions of the
Third World will heighten the multicultural diversity of society. This will no
doubt give rise to social tensions. But if those tensions are dealt with
productively, they can foster a political mobilization that will give additional
impetus to the new endogenous social movements already emergent within
nation-States – I am thinking of the peace, environmental, and women’s
movements. These tendencies would strengthen the relevance that public
issues have for the lifeworld. At the same time, there is a growing pressure of
problems that can be solved only at a coordinated European level. Under
these conditions, communication complexes could develop in Europe-wide
public spheres. These publics would provide a favorable context both for new
parliamentary bodies of regions that are now in the process of merging and for
a European Parliament furnished with greater authority. (Habermas 1996, pp.
506-507)

Habermas is fully aware that at the international level there are
difficulties even for this communicative and argumentative form of
deliberation that he offers as an alternative to popular sovereignty
with the boundaries of the nation-State.
In a politically constituted community organized via a state, this
compromise formation is more closely meshed with procedures of deliberative
politics, so that agreements are not simply produced by an equalization of
interests in terms of power politics. Within the framework of a common
political culture, negotiation partners also have recourse to common value
orientations and shared conceptions of justice, which make an understanding
beyond instrumental-rational agreements possible. But on the international
level this “thick” communicative embeddedness is missing. (Habermas 2001,
p. 109)
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Habermas thinks that we can find new forms of postnational
unifying identity in exactly this attachment to these democratic
procedures, at the national and transnational level, which he
defines as a form of “constitutional patriotism”.
As the examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United
States demonstrate, a political culture in which constitutional principles can
take root need by no means depend on all citizens’ sharing the same language
or the same ethnic and cultural origins. A liberal political culture is only the
common denominator for a constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus)
that heightens an awareness of both the diversity and the integrity of the
different forms of life coexisting in a multicultural society. In a future Federal
Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be
interpreted from the perspectives of different national traditions and histories.
(Habermas 1996, p. 500)

However, it is exactly here that the problem with Habermas’
position lies: in his conception of democratic politics. His
communicative conception of the “categorical imperative”, ever
since his Theory of Communicative Action, means that, both at the
national and the international level, he has moved away from
politics as confrontation or struggle between antagonistic class
strategies (even if they are articulated as competing versions of
what is the “collective will” of society), towards a normative and
procedural conception of politics as attempt towards creating
optimal conditions of communication and argumentation.
Such a discourse-theoretical understanding of democracy changes the
theoretical demands placed on the legitimacy conditions for democratic
politics. A functioning public sphere, the quality of discussion, accessibility,
and the discursive structure of opinion- and will-formation: all of these could
never entirely replace conventional procedures for decision-making and
political representation. But they do tip the balance, from the concrete
embodiments of sovereign will in persons, votes, and collectives to the
procedural demands of communicative and decision-making processes. And
this loosens the conceptual ties between democratic legitimacy and the familiar
forms of state organization. (Habermas 2001, pp. 110-111)

That is why Habermas tends towards rather modest proposals
for increased participation of NGOs and social movements in
negotiation processes, as part of this procedural and
communicative conception of collective practice.
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[T]he institutionalized participation of non-governmental organizations in
the deliberations of international negotiating systems would strengthen the
legitimacy of the procedure insofar as mid-level transnational decision-making
processes could then be rendered transparent for national public spheres, and
thus be reconnected with decision-making procedures at the grassroots level.
(Habermas 2001, p. 111)

However, the experience of all recent negotiations of
international agreements and treaties along with the everyday
functioning of the EU has shown that such deliberations do not
fundamentally alter the course of things or affect the actual
decision processes. In certain cases, they are simply attempts to
offer legitimization to processes that are fundamentally
authoritarian and undemocratic.
On her part, Seyla Benhabib has offered a problematized version
of the Kantian conceptualization of cosmopolitan rights, by means
of a reading of Arendt’s critical approach to both the nation-State
and world government. She is aware of what she defines as the
“paradox of democratic legitimacy”, namely the fact that the rights
of the subaltern have to be negotiated upon a terrain “flanked by
human rights on the hand and sovereignty assertions on the other”
(Benhabib 2004, p. 47). Consequently, what she suggests is a form
of cosmopolitan federalism, based upon porous – not open –
borders based upon a combination between the rights of refugees
and migrants and the acceptance of the continuous existence of
nation-States.
In the spirit of Kant, therefore, I have pleaded for moral universalism and
cosmopolitan federalism. I have not advocated open but rather porous borders. I
have pleaded for first-admittance rights for refugees and asylum-seekers, but
have accepted the right of democracies to regulate the transition from full
membership. (Benhabib 2004, p. 220-221)

The main problem with this neo-Kantian approach is, in my
opinion, two-fold. Faced with the contradiction between the
abstract universalism of a normative conception of cosmopolitan
rights, itself based upon the projection of a universal community of
human beings as subjects, which is obviously unattainable, they
easily opt for a more realistic approach of trying to guarantee some
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aspects of these rights as part of actual national or supranational
configuration, leading to all forms of compromises with current
policies, policies that in the end run counter to exactly this
conception of universal rights.
In this sense, it is exactly the European Union and its evolution
that up to now offers a very material counterargument to the neoKantian position. The emerging constitutionalism without
democracy, in the form of a guarantee of basic rights (for ‘EU
nationals’) that goes hand and in hand with an authoritarian
erosion of democratic process without precedent, and with the
dismantling of social rights and the welfare state, offers the
absolute limit of any attempt to think of European Integration as
the materialization of Kant’s vision.4
Moreover, the new forms of exclusion and the new barriers to
migration and the right to safe passage of refugees make it evident
that the EU is far from enforcing any kind of cosmopolitan rights.
Finally, the new forms of anti-terrorist preventive practices such as
attempts at detecting early signs of ‘radicalization’, along with
officially treating the Muslim segments of the European working
classes as potentially ‘dangerous classes’, imply the continuity of
elements of a colonial ideology and practice, this time turned
towards the interior of European Union.5
Some, exemplified by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson’s
conceptualization of a radical politics of border struggles as
productions of new commons, have attempted to go beyond the
normative universalism of this Kantian conception of
cosmopolitan rights. However, in the end, they cannot avoid the
oscillation between a radical emphasis on the singularity of
struggles that create, in their multitudinous plurality, the new
translations of the common, and an acceptance of the framework
of European Integration or other institutional forms of
‘globalization’ as given. This is based upon the premise that many
struggles can no longer be waged at the level of the national-state:
While the exclusionary dimension of the nation-State, symbolized and
implemented by the border, is still very much present in the contemporary
4

On the evolution of the EU see Anderson 2009; Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Durand (ed.) 2013.
On Islamophobia as an alarming global trend see Kumar 2012; Kundnani 2014; Todd
2015.
5
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world, there still are “defensive” struggles, for instance, for social commons,
that are fought at the level of the state. This is probably rightly so. But
independently of what we have written about the structural antinomy between
the public and the common, the political production of space historically
associated with the state no longer offers an effective shield against capital.
This means it is a matter of realism for the political project of the common to
refuse the idea of positioning itself within existing bounded institutional
spaces and to look for the necessary production of new political spaces.
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 303)

This leads to a position that, while it is oriented toward radical
forms of emancipation that transcend the capitalist horizon, at the
same time it is ready to accept the possibility of more ‘realist’
positions within the framework even of European Integration.
It would be too easy, but no less true, to maintain that the current crisis of
European integration makes the huge intellectual investments since the early
1990s in the postnational citizenship emerging in its frame at least overproportioned. This is not to say that we do not see a chance for the political
project of the common in the gaps of official institutional structures, which
are themselves in-the-making, multilevel, and crisscrossed by multiple crises in
Europe and elsewhere in the world. We are convinced that social struggles can
nurture a new political imagination capable of working through current
processes of regional integration and of opening them toward a reinvention of
internationalism. (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 305)

In a similar manner we see in Saskia Sassen’s work an attempt to
re-think the possibility of a “global civil society” not in terms of a
normative conception but of an articulation of struggles at the
global level that also has the problem of taking as somewhat given
the current forms of ‘globalization’, even if the emphasis is on
struggles rather than institutional forms.
The category of global civil society is, in a way, too general to capture the
specific transboundary networks and formations connecting or articulating
multiple places and actors. A focus on these specifics brings “global civil
society” down to the spaces and practices of daily life, furthered by today’s
powerful imaginaries around the idea that others around the world are
engaged in the same struggles. This begins to constitute a sense of global civil
society that is rooted in the daily spaces of people rather than on some global
stage. It also means that the poor, those who cannot travel, can be part of
global civil society. I include here cross-border networks of activists engaged
in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda and
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non- cosmopolitan forms of global politics and imaginaries attached to local
issues and struggles. (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 305)

2. Balibar and the contradictions of citizenship
In light of the above, Étienne Balibar’s attempts to rethink
questions of citizenship are of great interest. Balibar underlines the
fact that the exclusionary aspect of nationalism and even racism
were one pole of the contradiction of the emergence of
contemporary political forms associated with the nation-State, the
other being the demand for equality and liberty, what he defines
with the neologism “equaliberty”.
Here is the extraordinary novelty and at the same time the root of all the
difficulties, the nub of the contradiction. If one really wants to read it literally,
the Declaration in fact says that equality is identical to freedom, is equal to
freedom, and vice versa. Each is the exact measure of the other. This is what I
propose to call, with a deliberately baroque phrase, the proposition of
equaliberty – a portmanteau term, impossible and yet possible only as a play
on words, that alone expresses the central proposition. (Balibar 2014, p. 46)

The key point is a new form of citizenship based upon the
contradictory identification of rights of citizen and rights of man.
This new form of citizenship opens up a way for the expansion of
the very sphere of politics in ways that also enable the political
participation and demands of the subaltern classes.
[T]he signification of the equation Man = Citizen is not so much the
definition of a political right as the affirmation of a universal right to politics.
Formally, at least – but this is the very type of a form that can become a
material weapon – the Declaration opens an indefinite sphere for the
politicization of rights claims, each of which reiterates in its own way the
demand for citizenship or for an institutional, public inscription of freedom
and equality. The rights claims of workers or of dependents as well as those of
women or slaves, and later those of the colonized, is inscribed within this
indefinite opening, as we see in attempts beginning in the revolutionary
period. (Balibar 2014, p. 50)

Moreover, this emerging new conception of citizenship is also
accompanied by a new conception of sovereignty based upon this
new conception of politics, this new politicization of society, this
new opening up of the political space.
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As far as sovereignty is concerned, as I have tried to show elsewhere, the
revolutionary innovation consists precisely in subverting the traditional
concept by posing the highly paradoxical thesis of an egalitarian sovereignty –
practically a contradiction in terms, but the only way to radically get rid of all
transcendence and inscribe the political and social order in the element of
immanence, of the self-constitution of the people. From there, however,
begins the immediate development of a whole series of contradictions that
proceed from the fact that so-called civil society and especially the state are
entirely structured by hierarchies or dependencies that are both indifferent to
political sovereignty and essential to its institutionalization, even though
society or the modern city no longer has at its disposal the means of the
ancient city for neutralizing these contradictions and pushing them out of the
public sphere, namely, the rigorous compartmentalization of the oikos and the
polis. (Balibar 2014, p. 42)

However, this new formulation of politics is from the beginning
traversed by an important contradiction between a politics of
insurrection, the revolutionary aspect of the emergence of
democratic politics, and a politics of constitution, the politics
associated with the State and the established order.
[T]his affirmation introduces an individual oscillation, induces a structural
equivocation between two obviously antinomic politics: a politics of
insurrection and a politics of constitution – or, if you prefer, a politics of
permanent, uninterrupted revolution and a politics of the state as institutional
order. (Balibar 2014, p.p. 52-53)

It is here that we find the problem with the emergence of the
Nation as the political and ideological form of the new collective
subject of democratic politics. Balibar insists that we can witness
this tension even at the moment of the French Revolution:
The system of Fraternity tends to be doubled into a national fraternity and,
before long, a statist, revolutionary, social fraternity wherein extreme
egalitarianism finds expression in communism. The meaning of the Nation
changes: it no longer means all the citizens in opposition to the monarch and
the privileged, but the idea of a historical belonging centered on the state. At
the extreme, through the mythification of language, culture, and national
traditions, it will become the French version of nationalism, the idea of a
moral and cultural community founded on institutional traditions. Opposed to
it, on the contrary, the notion of the people drifts toward the general idea of
the proletariat as the people’s people. (Balibar 2014, p. 55)
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For Balibar this tension points to the fact that “political
modernity comprises two antithetical movements with respect to
‘anthropological differences’”. On the one hand, we have the
universalism that “promoted or invented a notion of the citizen
that implies not only that an individual belongs to a community but
also that he has access to a system of rights from which no human
being can be legitimately excluded.” (Balibar 2017, p. 275). On the other
hand, “modernity enlarges as never before the project of classifying
human beings precisely in terms of their differences” (Balibar 2017,
p. 276). This can explain the violence and brutality of modern
forms of exclusion and racism.
Because the human and the political (the “rights of man” and the “rights of the
citizen”) are coextensive “by right,” the human being cannot be denied access to citizenship
unless, contradictorily, he is also excised from humanity. Therefore – and I apologize
for the brutality of a formulation that is nonetheless all-too-relevant in reality
because of past and present exclusions based on race, sex, deviance,
pathologies, to mention only a few – the human being can be denied such
access only by being reduced to subhumanity or defective humanity. (Balibar
2017, p. 276)

Consequently, Balibar’s proposition for a “transnational
citizenship”(Balibar 2003) is an attempt to answer the problems
associated with racism and exclusion and the grand movements of
migrants and refugees, at the same time acknowledging the
persistence of the nation-State and the new challenges posed by the
emergence of forms like the European Union. This is also evident
in his attempt to discuss ways to “democratize democracy” in ways
that incorporate contemporary struggles, treating insurrection as
the “active modality of citizenship: the modality that it brings into
action.” (Balibar 2015, p. 131). The problem is that, although Balibar
is in no way a naive partisan of European Integration, something
exemplified in his insistence that “along with the development of a
formal ‘European Citizenship’, a real ‘European Apartheid’ has
emerged” (Balibar 2003, p. 121), in the end he attempts to take it
for granted as the terrain for such a strategy.
3. The problems with the neo-republican defence of the nation-State
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A certain opposition to the above discussed positions comes in
the form of what we can define as a neo-republican defence of the
nation-State and of national identities. Here the line of reasoning is
the following. Despite the rhetoric of globalization, nation-States
remain indispensable nodes for the reproduction of capitalism.
Emerging supranational forms, such as the European Union and
the entire drive towards European Integration tend to undermine
nation-States in favour of the forces of globalized capital and also
to erode democracy by sharply reducing the terrain and scope of
popular sovereignty. Capitalist elites accept this condition of
limited or eroded sovereignty because they want to be part of
globalized reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This erosion of
democracy undermines democracy, because democracy can only be
an active political condition when there are a demos and a popular
will that can be exercised in a particular territory. There can be no
supranational demos and consequently no cosmopolitan
democracy.
Up until this point, this neo-republican argument indeed points
to actual problems with contemporary forms of reduced
sovereignty and the absence of real democratic process at the level
of supranational institutional arrangements such as the European
Union. However, there is another aspect to this argument: the
association of demos with the nation. According to this argument
the political body, in order to be a democratic political body,
requires an element of common culture, history and community, a
necessary commitment to a common identity. Consequently, the
argument goes, contemporary ‘multiculturalism’, in the sense of
mass migration but also in the sense of emergence of a globalized
mass culture has undermined the necessary common identity and
common commitment that is the backbone of the emergence of
the modern forms of popular sovereignty. Some versions of this
argument have been used by the Far Right in order to defend their
own version of neo-racist politics, especially in relation to closed
borders and discriminations against migrants and refugees in the
name of a return to the necessary supposed ‘purity of the nation’ or
of the purity of the ‘national culture’.
In other instances, this discourse distances itself from any
openly racist arguments, but it does centre upon the need for some
common elements of political culture that supposedly enable this
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re-emergence of the demos-people of the nation-State. The French
version of ‘Republicanism’ offers such a case.6 And it is interesting
to see the positions of some of the left-wing proponents of neorepublicanism.
Perhaps the most telling case is that of Régis Debray. The
former guerrillero already in 1978 was insisting on the importance of
the national aspects of any revolutionary sequence:
The reason is that if the masses do make history, and if they are not an
abstraction roaming around above existing frontiers and languages – if they
exist only within circumscribed cultural and natural communities – then they
make history as and where they are, from below and not above, piece-meal
and not globally. There is no one single history for everybody; the time of
history is not the same in Tokyo, Paris, Peking and Venezuela. When a world
revolutionary programme attempts to gather multiplicity into unity and
rationalize the whole movement, it goes against the historical process itself, for
the latter proceeds from unity to multiplicity. Things always happen from
below, multiplicity is always victorious. (Debray 1978, p. 37)

It is obvious that we are still dealing here with an attempt to see
the national aspects of any potential revolutionary sequence,
echoing in a certain manner the relation of national and social
struggles in the revolutionary movements in the Third World.
However, from the 1980s onwards, Debray’s positions moved
from the question of revolution to the question of what constitutes
the reclaiming of the French republican tradition. As Émile Chabal
has stressed, for Debray the Republic as “a repository of national
memory, cultural heritage and enlightenment values [...] is the only
possible bulwark against the decadence of Democracy and the
warped ethics of financial capitalism” (Chabal 2015, p. 41). More
recently, he has offered an impressive defence of frontiers in which
he attacks all those who call for a world without borders as being
defenders of the economism of the ‘global marketplace’, of
‘technicism’, of ‘absolutism’ and of imperialism, against which he
calls for “a right to the frontier”(Debray 2010).
Another example is the work of Jacques Sapir, a former student
of Charles Bettelheim, a specialist in the transition from the USSR
to Russia and one of the fiercest critics of globalization but also of
6

For a definition and critique of current neo-republicanism in the French context, see
Todd 2015.
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European Integration. However interesting are many of his
observations regarding globalization, the problems with the
Eurozone and his critique of the EU, at the same time his positions
encapsulate the problem with a certain version of the neorepublican argument. Sapir is careful to avoid any identification of
the Nation to race or even common origin. What he insists upon is
the centrality of the people, defined as political body sharing
common values and not common ancestry. This unity of the
political body is threatened, according to Sapir, by new forms of
communitarianism, especially those related to religion. For Sapir
the attack on sovereignty opens up the way for its dissolution. The
unity of the people requires secularism, because it is secularism that
relegates these religious and communitarian elements to the private
sphere. “We cannot have a people, the base of the political
construction of popular sovereignty, without secularism which
confines to the private sphere the divergences upon which no
discussion can be held” (Sapir 2016, Kindle locations 308-314).
Sapir refuses any conceptualization of ethnicity in biological terms,
yet he insists on the need for anyone participating in the nation to
share the history and the language of any society s/he participates
in. Consequently, in a certain way he is a posteriori making a certain
reference to national identity a prerequisite for participation in the
political process.
Ethnicity [l’ethnie] is a social construction and not a biological reality and
sometimes it has to do with a discursive myth used to separate one population
from another. But after we have repeated these truths, we will, nevertheless,
be confronted with the acquisition of the necessary rules for a life in society by
those that newly arrive to become part of a population. And it is here that we
find the frontier between the mythical discourse of a “big replacement” and
the fact, equally real, of the failure of integration of a part of the immigrant
populations, because these do not have the references that they could
assimilate. Integration is a process of assimilation of rules and customs which
is in part conscious – we make an effort to learn the language and history into
which we want to integrate into – but it is equally unconscious. For this
unconscious mechanism to be put into motion there is also need of a
reference point. Disappearing or effacing this reference point in the name of a
multiculturalism that only means the tolerance to practices that are very
different is a real obstacle to this integration. (Sapir 2016, Kindle location
1058-1067)
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It is here that we see the crucial semantic shift of this neorepublican defence of the nation. The very notion of common
culture brings us very close to classical nationalism and it is a welldocumented fact that most versions of racism in Europe in the
past decades do not focus on origin but upon sharing of a common
culture. Sapir is very clear that the formation of a people requires
common values: “it is clear that without ‘common value’, a human
community cannot constitute a political community” (Sapir 2016,
Kindle locations 1542-1544). And here is the problem with this
position: How can we define these common values? How we deal
with the fact that in class societies these values represent
hegemonic strategies? What about the challenge posed by
colonialism, both in its past but also in its present in the form of
discrimination against former colonial subjects now living in the
metropolis.
Moreover, Sapir is very clear that he considers that there is a
problem with certain immigrant communities and that he believes
that they cannot integrate. He thinks that there is a certain segment
of the immigrant youth that shows elements of anomie and their
opting of identity reveals the kind of narcissism that Sapir
associates with fundamentalism. It is in these terms that he
designates multiculturalism as the enemy, in the sense that he
thinks that a multiculturalist embracing of heterogeneity
undermines the convergence in terms of culture of values that is
necessary for the political construction of the people.
There is here a dialectic that we cannot surpass and with which we are
condemned to live. If heterogeneity is a state of the political community, its
constitution in ‘people for itself’ can only be made by means of a convergence
of aspirations and views on the future. This convergence implies a common
political culture and this is contradictory with multiculturalism. (Sapir 2016,
Kindle locations 873-879).

However, despite Sapir’s attempts to offer a conceptualization
of the political construction of the people of popular sovereignty,
in the end he opts for a rather classical conception of the Nation,
along with the State, as the basis of popular sovereignty, a position
that brings us back to all the classical problems associated with a
national conception of contemporary societies.
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Therefore, the idea of separating the people from the nation and from the
State, even if it is necessary from an analytical point of view, is impossible
from the point of view of practical result. The people, conceived as political
community, have no concrete existence outside the State and the nation, even
if it can consciously, but also unconsciously, transform both. There are
complex relations between the people, the nation and the State and these
relations defy simplifications. The constitution of a people united in its will to
live together and to create in common, even if this will may partly be the fruit
of institutions that have constructed necessary affects, is indeed the point of
obligatory passage without which the constitution of a nation will fail. This is
one of the lessons that we must retain from the centrality of the concept of
sovereignty. When a population, whatever it is, desires to make something in
common, there is sovereignty. But from the moment that this population is
heterogeneous, it helps to move certain questions out of the public space.
That is why, for many centuries, a necessary alliance pact has been in force
between sovereignty and secularism. (Sapir 2016, Kindle locations 2829-2838)

Therefore, in the case of Sapir, from the question of the political
construction of the people, we move back to the nation as
common culture, history, and language and as the need to exclude
from the political (and cultural) space of the people certain cultural
or religious reference points, however important they might be for
large segments of the subaltern classes of immigrant origin. And in
the case of Sapir, this can lead to dangerous political associations,
such as his recent insistence to treat the Far Right Front National as
a potential part of a broader front in favour of sovereignty.
In general, it would be unfair to say that this conception of the
secular and democratic nation as the community of the demos is
based upon strictly national or racial elements. One might say that
most supporters of a neo-republican conception of the nation-State
opt for some form of a performative conception of nationhood.
For them it is not a question of race, ethnicity or colour, but of the
performance of certain cultural and discursive elements that
guarantee the unity of the demos: rationalism, secularism,
tolerance, multiculturalism and a certain form of feminism.
Especially the feminist aspect was particularly important in France,
in the support given by mainstream feminism to repressive
measures such as the ban on the headscarf in the name of
liberation of women, despite the opposition from exactly the
subjects supposed to be liberated (Levy 2010; Boggio Éwanjé-Épée
and Magliani-Belkacem 2012). However, the end result is the same
as with ‘typical’ racism: a multiplication of forms of exclusion and
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an increasing tendency towards treating collective practices,
cultures, discourses as inappropriate for democratic participation,
as reasons to forbid the participation in the collective political body
of the people.
4. The colonial trauma at the heart of the nation-State
Moreover, in the debates on secularism, especially in France with
all the political confrontations around the notion of laïcité we can
see the reproduction of elements of a certain Islamophobia and a
certain reluctance to deal with the colonial past and its continuous
effectivity in order to understand the forms of contemporary
racism. The 2003 debate around the question of the scarf brought
forward the unease of certain segments of the Left, including some
from the anticapitalist Left, with the reality of the cultural referents
of subaltern strata of immigrant origin, and the danger that a
certain kind of neo-republican defence of secularism and laïcité can
lead to alliances with systemic political forces. Laurent Lévy (2010)
has offered a very powerful account of these debates. It is also
important to note that there have also been other important
contributions recently to these debates that highlight that the
‘divergences’ in French society that Sapir stressed are not the result
of the supposed narcissistic attachment of immigrant youth to
fundamentalism but of the actual continuation of colonialism inside
French society, not only in the form of ideological prejudice but
also of real exclusion. Sadri Khiari offers an important account of
the history of racism and discrimination in France and how racism
was in fact a class political strategy on the part of the dominant
classes (Khiari 2009). Moreover, recent developments and antiracist and anti-colonial struggles have shown that integration is not
an attempt towards creating a more open political community but
in reality a way to enhance exclusion and separation. It is obvious
that we are also dealing here with the fact that, from the very
beginning, colonialism was the dark side of the construction of the
modern nation-State, especially in Europe, exemplified in the way
in which both the war and the liberation of Algeria was perceived
in France. In a similar manner, contemporary interventions on the
part of radical antiracism especially in France, such as the collective
effort of the current associated with the Parti des Indigènes de la
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République (Bouteldja and Khiari 2012), offer an important
reminder of the persistence of a neo-colonial form of state-induced
racism still active at the heart of the European Project. Moreover,
they make it evident that contemporary forms of attacks against the
Muslim segments of the working classes of Europe, supposedly in
the name of containing ‘radical Islam’, in fact represent class
strategies in order to keep them in a very particular condition of
subalternity. However, what is most worrying is the tendency by
certain segments of the radical Left, including the anticapitalist left,
to accept some of the basic tenets of such positions, exemplified in
the support of the Left of certain forms of ‘forced emancipation’ in
the name of the secular state.
However, the same trauma at the heart of the modern nationState could also be observed elsewhere. Hannah Arendt, a critical
witness to one of the most important recent conscious attempts at
nation-building, namely the formation of modern Israel, offered
important warnings in the 1940s about the association of popular
sovereignty and nationalism, especially in cases where the political
establishment of the nation was also based on a founding moment
of exclusion and oppression of other people already there (Arendt
2007).
5. Gramsci’s thinking on the national-popular
So the question remains: is it possible to conceive of some form
of recuperation of popular sovereignty, without having to fall back
into some form of nationalism or any variety of the political and
ideological constructions that tend to reproduce exclusion or neocolonial exclusion?
One way to deal with this is by a return to Gramsci. Gramsci’s
preoccupation with the emergence of what he defined the nationalpopular will is well known.7 For Gramsci the “national-popular”
collective will represents a form of modern statehood associated
with the revolutionary “Jacobin” tradition of the bourgeoisie, an
element missing from the emergence of the Italian State, in many
instances.
7

On the broader notion of the “national-popular” in Gramsci, from literature to politics,
see Durante 2009.
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One of the first sections must precisely be devoted to the “collective will”,
posing the question in the following terms: “When can the conditions for
awakening and developing a national-popular collective will be said to exist?”
Hence an historical (economic) analysis of the social structure of the given
country and a “dramatic” representation of the attempts made in the course of
the centuries to awaken this will, together with the reasons for the successive
failures. Why was there no absolute monarchy in Italy in Machiavelli’s time?
One has to go back to the Roman Empire (the language question, problem of
the intellectuals, etc.), and understand the function of the mediaeval
Communes, the significance of Catholicism etc. In short, one has to make an
outline of the whole history of Italy – in synthesis, but accurate.
The reason for the failures of the successive attempts to create a nationalpopular collective will is to be sought in the existence of certain specific social
groups which were formed at the dissolution of the Communal bourgeoisie; in
the particular character of other groups which reflect the international
function of Italy as seat of the Church and depositary of the Holy Roman
Empire; and so on. [...] An effective Jacobin force was always missing, and
could not be constituted; and it was precisely such a Jacobin force which in
other nations awakened and organised the national-popular collective will, and
founded the modem States. (Q 13, §1; SPN, pp. 130-131)

However, Gramsci stresses the fact that this kind of formation
of the national-popular will represents only a particular
‘revolutionary’ phase of the bourgeoisie and that “[a]ll history from
1815 onwards shows the efforts of the traditional classes to
prevent the formation of a collective will of this kind, and to
maintain ‘economic-corporate’ power in an international system of
passive equilibrium” (Q 13, §1; SPN, p. 132).
Gramsci uses the French example and the particular importance
of the role of the subaltern classes in the formation of the nationalpopular will in order to emphasize the absence of such an element
in the Italian case. However schematic his conceptualization of the
French case might be, the important point lies in his attempt to
emphasize the possibilities of alternative forms of formation of the
national-popular element, depending upon different national
histories.
The works of French historians and French culture in general have been
able to develop and become ‘national-popular’ because of the very complexity
and variety of French political history in the last 150 years. [...] A unilinear
national ‘hagiography’ is impossible: any attempt of this sort appears
immediately sectarian, false, utopian, and anti-national because one is forced to
cut out or undervalue unforgettable pages of national history (see Maurras’
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current line and Bainville’s miserable history of France). That is why the
permanent element of these political variations, the people-nation, has become
the protagonist of French history. Hence a type of political and cultural
nationalism that goes beyond the bounds of the strictly nationalist parties and
impregnates the whole culture. Hence also a close and dependent relationship
between people-nation and intellectuals.
There is nothing of the sort in Italy, where one must search the past by
torchlight to discover national feeling, and move with the aid of distinctions,
interpretations, and discreet silences. [...] Consequently, in the history of the
nineteenth century, there could not have been national unity, since the
permanent element, the people-nation, was missing. On the one hand, the
dynastic element had to prevail given the support it received from the state
apparatus, and the divergent political currents could not have had a shared
minimum objective. [...] Due to this position of theirs, the intellectuals had to
distinguish themselves from the people, place themselves outside, create or
reinforce among themselves a spirit of caste and have a deep distrust of the
people, feeling them to be foreign, fearing them, because, in reality, the people
were something unknown, a mysterious hydra with innumerable heads.
[...] But one must not deny that many steps forward have been taken in
every sense: to do so would be to fall into an opposite rhetoric. On the
contrary, many intellectual movements, especially before the war, attempted to
renew the culture, strip away its rhetoric and bring it nearer to the people, in
other words nationalize it. (The two tendencies could be called nation-people
and nation-rhetoric.) (Q 3, §82; CW, pp. 255-7)

It is interesting to note the distinction that Gramsci makes
between nation-people (popolo-nazione) and nation-rhetoric,
which marks exactly the negative version of nationalism, one that
does not incorporate the popular, the subaltern element. The same
goes for Gramsci’s critique of any conception of the eternity of the
nation (an important point taking into consideration the element of
a perceived historical continuity in the Italian peninsula). “The
preconception that Italy has always been a nation complicates its
entire history and requires anti-historical intellectual acrobatics” (Q
3, §82; CW, pp. 255-7). Hence, we have Gramsci’s denouncement
of easy nationalist rhetorical constructions.
This fact is the most peremptory confirmation that in Italy writers are
separated from the public and that the public seeks ‘its’ literature abroad
because it feels that this literature is more ‘its own’ than the so-called national
literature. In this fact lies an essential problem of national life. If it is true that
each century or fraction of a century has its own literature, it is not always true
that this literature is produced in the same national community. Every people
has its own literature, but this can come to it from another people, in other
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words the people in question can be subordinated to the intellectual and moral
hegemony of other peoples. This is often the most strident paradox for many
monopolistic tendencies of a nationalistic and repressive character: while they
make magnificent hegemonic plans, they fail to realize that they are the object
of foreign hegemonies, just as while they make imperialistic plans, they are in
fact the object of other imperialisms. (Q 23, §57; CW, p. 255)

For Gramsci the national element cannot be identified with the
nationalistic element. The national element, regarding culture and
ideological production, refers to a particular relation with a national
history and a historical / cultural environment not with loyalty to a
national group. One might say that it is an analytic not a
prescriptive term:
National, in other words, is different from nationalist. Goethe was a
German ‘national’, Stendhal a French ‘national’, but neither of them was a
nationalist. An idea is not effective if it is not expressed in some way,
artistically, that is, particularly. But is a spirit particular in as much as it is
national? Nationality is a primary particularity, but the great writer is further
particularized among his fellow countrymen and this second ‘particularity’ is
not the extension of the first. Renan, as Renan, is by no means a necessary
consequence of the French spirit. Through his relation to it he is an original
event, arbitrary and (as Bergson says) unpredictable. And yet, Renan remains
French, just as man, while being man, remains animal. But his value, as is true
of man, lies precisely in his difference from the group from which he was
born.
It is precisely this that the nationalists do not want. For them the value of
the masters (great intellectuals) consists in their likeness to the spirit of their
group, in their loyalty, in their punctual expression of this spirit (which is,
moreover, defined as the spirit of the masters (great intellectuals) so one
always ends up being right). (Q 2, §2; CW, pp. 260-1)

For Gramsci the national element refers not to some ideal or
some form of social essence but rather to the different and specific
histories of each social formation, and the different historicities
expressed in the particular relations of force that determine the
context of each society. Moreover, this is something that has to be
taken into account in any attempt to formulate a revolutionary
strategy that has to be national, in the sense that the point of
departure of any revolutionary project is national, any hegemonic
project must take into account these national peculiarities.
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In reality, the internal relations of any nation are the result of a
combination which is “original” and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations
must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one
wishes to dominate them and direct them. To be sure, the line of development
is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is “national” – and it is
from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is
international and cannot be otherwise. Consequently, it is necessary to study
accurately the combination of national forces which the international class [the
proletariat] will have to lead and develop, in accordance with the international
perspective and directives [i.e. those of the Comintern8]. The leading class is in
fact only such if it accurately interprets this combination – of which it is itself
a component and precisely as such is able to give the movement a certain
direction, within certain perspectives. (Q 14, §17; SPN, p. 240)

Despite the fact that the working class is the only class truly
internationalist in scope and in a sense the bearer of a new type of
universalism, any strategy for working class hegemony passes
through this attention to the national element, this need to
‘nationalize’ itself to a certain extent:
It is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies which are national in
character are knotted together; one can well understand how certain
tendencies either do not mention such a concept, or merely skim over it. A
class that is international in character has – in as much as it guides social strata
which are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less
than national: particularistic and municipalistic (the peasants) – to ‘nationalise’
itself in a certain sense. (Q 14, §17; SPN, p. 241)

It is also interesting that Gramsci insisted on the different
qualities that a proletarian or popular version of collective will
might have, emphasizing the ‘cosmopolitan’ and internationalist
elements in the proletarian collective will. In contrast to the
attempt by Enrico Corradini to justify nationalism and imperialist
expansion on the basis of the character of Italy as “proletarian
nation” and Giovanni Pascoli’s hybrid ‘proletarian nationalism’,9
Gramsci insists on the emancipatory and transformative elements
in a potential Italian working class “cosmopolitanism”, enhanced
8

“i.e. those of the Comintern” is an explanatory note added by the SPN translators [ed.].
On Gramsci’s interest in this attempt towards the construction of a ‘proletarian
nationalism’, which coincided with Italian imperial ambitions at the beginning of the twentieth
century (leading to the invasion and occupation of Libya in 1911), see the references in the text
on the “Southern Question” (Gramsci 1978, p. 450) and in the Prison Notebooks: Q 2, §§51 and
52 (PN1, p. 295-300).
9
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by the experience of migration and based not upon some abstract
universalism but upon the very particular universality of the
working class condition, the universality of subalternity. It is this
that makes it part of a broader project of social transformation and
emancipation.
At present in Italy the element ‘man’ is either ‘man-capital’ or ‘man-labour’.
Italian expansion can only be that of ‘man-labour’ and the intellectual who
represents ‘man-labour’ is not the traditional intellectual, swollen with rhetoric
and literary memories of the past. Traditional Italian cosmopolitanism should
become a modern type of cosmopolitanism, one that can assure the best
conditions for the development of Italian ‘man-labour’ in whatever part of the
world he happens to be. Not the citizen of the world as civis romanus or as
Catholic, but as producer of civilization. One can therefore maintain that the
Italian tradition is continued dialectically in the working people and their
intellectuals, not in the traditional citizen and the traditional intellectual. The
Italian people are the people with the greatest ‘national’ interest in a modern
form of cosmopolitanism. Not only the worker but also the peasant, especially
the southern peasant. It is in the tradition of the Italian people and Italian
history to collaborate in rebuilding the world in an economically unified way
not in order to dominate it hegemonically and appropriate the fruit of others’
labour but to exist and develop precisely as the Italian people. It can be shown
that Caesar is at the source of this tradition. Nationalism of the French stamp
is an anachronistic excrescence in Italian history, proper to people who have
their heads turned backwards like the damned in Dante. The ‘mission’ of the
Italian people lies in the recovery of Roman and medieval cosmopolitanism,
but in its most modern and advanced form. Even indeed a proletarian nation,
as Pascoli wanted; proletarian as a nation because it has been the reserve army
of foreign capitalism, because together with the Slavic peoples it has given
skilled workers to the entire world. For this very reason, it must join the
modern front struggling to reorganize also the non-Italian world, which it has
helped to create with its labour. (Q 19, §5, p. 1988; CW, pp. 246-247)

Gramsci had this conception of the proletariat as the only truly
‘national’ class – in the sense of achieving a higher form of unity of
a society but also with an internationalist scope – already in 1919.
In an article in October 1919 in Ordine Nuovo, Gramsci insists that:
Today, the ‘national’ class is the proletariat, and the multitude of the
workers and peasants, of Italian working people, who cannot allow the breakup of the nation, because the unity of the State is the form of the organization
of production and of exchange constructed by Italian labour, is the patrimony
of social wealth that the proletarians want to bring to the Communist
International. Only the proletarian State, the proletarian dictatorship, can
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today stop the process of dissolution of the national unity (Gramsci 2008, p.
19; originally in “L’Ordine Nuovo”, 4 October 1919).10

It is on the basis of this assumption regarding the inability of the
bourgeoisie to actually lead the project for the formation of such a
national-popular will, that Gramsci assigns this task to the
“Modern Prince” the political form of a potential working class
hegemony. Here the emergence and formation of national-popular
will is linked both to a process of socialist transformation at the
economic sphere, but also to “intellectual and moral reform”:
The modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and
organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating the
terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will
towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern civilisation.
These two basic points – the formation of a national-popular collective will,
of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser and the
active, operative expression; and intellectual and moral reform – should
structure the entire work. The concrete, programmatic points must be
incorporated in the first part, that is they should result from the line of
discussion “dramatically”, and not be a cold and pedantic exposition of
arguments.
Can there be cultural reform, and can the position of the depressed strata
of society be improved culturally, without a previous economic reform and a
change in their position in the social and economic fields? Intellectual and
moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform-indeed
the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which
every intellectual and moral reform presents itself. The modern Prince, as it
develops, revolutionises the whole system of intellectual and moral relations,
in that its development means precisely that any given act is seen as useful or
harmful, as virtuous or as wicked, only in so far as it has as its point of
reference the modern Prince itself, and helps to strengthen or to oppose it. In
men’s consciences, the Prince takes the place of the divinity or the categorical
imperative, and becomes the basis for a modern laicism and for a complete
laicisation of all aspects of life and of all customary relationships (Q 13, §1;
SPN, pp. 132-133).

It is important to note that the notion of “moral and intellectual
reform”, which Gramsci borrows from but uses beyond its original
coinage by Ernest Renan and its reading by Sorel, not only forms
an important part of Gramsci’s critique of Croce, but also can be
associated with Lenin’s notion of the “cultural revolution”,
10

On Gramsci’s thinking on the “national question” see Santoro 2009.
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referring to the extent and depth of the intellectual, ideological and
cultural transformation that any hegemonic project requires
(Frosini 2009; Thomas 2009, p. 420; Rapone 2011, p. 113).
Leonardo Rapone, in his detailed study of Gramsci’s formative
years (1914-1919) has shown that Gramsci from the beginning,
faced with various forms of Italian nationalism had this conception
of socialism not only as a transformation of the economic structure
but also as a profound “intellectual renovation and moral
transformation” (Rapone 2011, p. 109) of Italian life. It is obvious
that here Gramsci refers to the national popular will being the
result of a process of profound economic, social and ideological
transformation as part of a socialist strategy and not just the
articulation of existing national elements. It is also significant that
in the first version of this passage in Q4, §33, instead of peoplenation the reference is to people-masses, something that
emphasizes that for Gramsci the emergence of the contemporary
nation is inextricably linked to the collective practices of the
popular masses. Moreover, it stresses the fact that for Gramsci the
“nation” in fact refers, to a great extent, to the subaltern classes
and in particular the working class.
Now, can we find in Gramsci’s writings a way to deal with the
challenges associated with questions of popular sovereignty and the
potential collective body that would express and implement it? I
understand that a possible objection would be that Gramsci dealt
with a period when the question was still about recognizing
subalternity as part of nationhood, that is of actually unifying the
nation and dealing with forms of internal exclusion, exemplified in
the Italian case with all the contradictions of the vicissitudes and
complexities of the Southern Question [quistione meridionale].
However, a closer reading of Gramsci’s various references to the
Southern Question even in his pre-prison writings suggests that his
conception of new process of unification under proletarian
leadership was not just about “unity” but also overcoming forms of
exclusion that resemble contemporary questions about decolonial
struggles.11 Already in January 1920 Gramsci was insisting that
11

And of course there are many references in his writings for his clear support of
decolonial struggles. See the following extract from a 1919 Ordine Nuovo article: “For several
years we Europeans have lived at the expense of the death of the coloured peoples:
unconscious vampires that we are, we have fed off their innocent blood. [...] But today flames
of revolt are being fanned throughout the colonial world. This is the class struggle of the
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The Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the
Islands, and reduced them to exploitable colonies; by emancipating itself from
capitalist slavery, the Northern proletariat will emancipate the Southern
peasant masses enslaved to the banks and the parasitic industry of the North.
The economic and political regeneration of the peasants should not be sought
in a division of uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands, but in the solidarity of
the industrial proletariat. This in turn needs the solidarity of the peasantry and
has an “interest” in ensuring that capitalism is not re-born economically from
landed property; that Southern Italy and the Islands do not become a military
base for capitalist counter-revolution (Gramsci 1977, p. 148).

Gramsci elaborates these questions more in his 1926 Some
Aspects of the Southern Question (Gramsci 1978, pp. 441-462), which
deals more with the complexities and difficulties in the creation of
this new form of national-popular unity, the role of intellectuals
and the questions that would late drive a great part of his
elaborations around the concept of hegemony.
At the same time, it is obvious that Gramsci’s writings dealt with
another conjuncture which, to a certain extent, justifies Stefan
Kipfer and Gillian Hart’s assessment that Gramsci is “both vital
and insufficient to approach anti- and post-colonial nationalisms”
(Kipfer and Hart 2013, p. 335). I would also agree with Kipfer and
Hart on the need to ‘stretch’ Gramsci beyond whatever
‘Eurocentric’ limitations his view had, into questions of “‘race’ and
ethnicity, as well as sexuality and gender” (Kipfer and Hart 2013, p.
332) and into a dialogue with the work of Fanon, since “[l]ike
Gramsci, Fanon saw organic intellectuals as organizers whose
leadership grows out of and constantly returns to the common and
good sense of subaltern life” (Kipfer and Hart 2013, p. 333).12
coloured peoples against their white exploiters and murderers. It is the vast irresistible drive
towards autonomy and independence of a whole world, with all its spiritual riches” (Gramsci
1977, pp. 59-60). See also the following passage, again from a 1920 Ordine Nuovo article: “In
this way the colonial populations become the foundation on which the whole edifice of
capitalist exploitation is erected. These populations are required to donate the whole of their
lives to the development of industrial civilization. For this they can expect no benefit in return;
indeed, they see their own countries systematically despoiled of their natural resources, i.e. of
the necessary conditions for their own autonomous development.” (Gramsci 1977, p. 302).
12
In a similar tone, Ato Sekyi-Otu has suggested that “I am tempted to call Gramsci a
precocious Fanonist. A Fanonist reading of Gramsci would indeed locate the historical
conditions of possibility of the ‘popular-national’ as project of the modern prince in his
portrait of the arrested development of the Italian bourgeoisie, the poverty of what he calls
(again prefiguring Fanon) its ‘national consciousness’, its twin cultural vices of
cosmopolitanism and narcissism, its historical inability to summon the oppressed of the
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Yet I would like to insist that, despite certain blind spots in his
thinking, Gramsci remains more pertinent in these contemporary
debates, exactly because he suggested a redefinition of the popolonazione based upon the determining inclusion and influence of the
subaltern classes, of the popular masses. In a certain manner, this
remains the case today.
6. Reconstructing the people
Therefore, I would suggest that the only way to rethink the
possibility of reclaiming popular sovereignty in a manner that does
avoid the pitfalls of both cosmopolitan universalism and
exclusionist nationalism is by means of a redefinition of the people
based upon the contemporary condition of subalternity in the
context of contemporary capitalist accumulation, which in fact has
expanded the linkages between subalternity and the subjection to
capitalist accumulation, in both direct and indirect ways. This
implies a redefinition of the people that delinks it from ethnicity,
origin or common history and instead links it to common
condition, present and struggle. It is a rather scissionist conception
of the people because it also includes an oppositional approach to
the ‘enemies of the people’, many of them nominally ‘members of
the nation’. Frédéric Lordon has offered a sufficiently provocative
description of this transformative and emancipatory conception of
the people, in terms of what he defines as the new landscape of the
nation, one which includes also this conception that not everyone
can belong to the people...
Here is the new landscape of nationality: Bernard Arnault? Not French.
Cahuzac? Not French. Johnny and Depardieu who wander around the world
like a self-service shop for passports? Not French. The Mamadous and the
Mohammeds that toil in sweatshops, that do the work that no one else wants
to do and pay their taxes are a thousand times more French than this race of
masters. The blue-bloods of tax evasion, out! Passport and welcome to all the
dark-coloured people are dwelling on this territory, those that have
contributed twice, by their labour and their taxes to collective life, a double

countryside onto the stage of national regeneration. [...] Without a doubt, the conceptual
supports of Fanon’s vision of the national, the social and the revolutionary as cognate terms of
a new political practice, have an elective affinity with Gramsci's philosophy of praxis and its
political implications.” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, pp. 118-119).
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contribution that gives its own unique criterion to the belonging to what, yes,
continues to be called a nation! (Lordon 2013)

It is obvious that we need a conception of the people that is
post-national and de-colonial. I would like to insist that we can
have a political conception or more exactly a politically performative
conception of the people and of – to use Gramscian terminology –
the people-nation. We are no longer dealing with the ‘imaginary
community’ of ‘common blood’; it is the unity in struggle of the
subaltern classes, the unity of those that share the same problems,
the same misery, the same hope, the same struggles. The people are
not a common origin; they represent a common condition and
perspective. It is an antagonistic conception of the nation that also
demands a ‘decolonialization’ of the nation, as recognition of the
consequences of colonialism and state racism, the struggle against
all forms of racism within a potential alliance of the subaltern
classes. And in this sense such a construction of the people is by
itself a terrain of social and political antagonism. In the words of
Stuart Hall,
The capacity to constitute classes and individuals as a popular force – that is
the nature of political and cultural struggle: to make the divided classes and the
separated peoples – divided and separated by culture as much as by other
factors – into a popular-democratic cultural force. (Hall 1998, pp. 452-453)

Institutionally, it is based upon the offering of full political rights
and not just ‘rights of hospitality’, to everyone living and working
in a given territory. Culturally it answers the dangers of predefined
cultural norms and values with a conception of democratic political
culture as constant reconstruction and constant ‘work in progress’.
I have stressed the element of the struggle against racism in all
its form as an important aspect of this (re)construction of people.
In contemporary societies, where racial divisions inside the
working class are becoming more important, the challenge of
overcoming racism is not just about unity of the working and
popular masses. As Jacques Rancière has suggested, the crucial
aspect is the identification with the cause of the other as a
constituent moment of the production of the people. Writing
about the importance of the movement against the French State’s
war in Algeria as a crucial aspect of political subjectification, he
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insists that the crucial step was the dis-identification with the
French State that was responsible for repression, including the
infamous 17 October 1961 police murders of more than 100
Algerian protesters in Paris. This process of dis-identification with
the State and the identification with the cause of the other is “the
production of a people that is different from the people that is seen,
talked, counted by the State, a people defined by the manifestation
of a harm made to the constitution of a common, which constructs
by itself another space of community” (Rancière 1997, p. 43).
In this sense, following Deleuze we are talking about a people
that is missing, a people that has to be produced, a people-to-come,
“[n]ot the myth of a past people, but the story-telling of the people
to come. The speech-act must create itself as a foreign language in
a dominant language, precisely in order to express an impossibility
of living under domination” (Deleuze 1989, p. 223).
7. From the popolo-nazione to the historical bloc
Consequently, we must return to Gramsci and his strategic and
transformative conception that links the popolo-nazione and a
potential historical bloc:
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the
leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic
cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence
knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is
the relationship one of representation. Only then can there take place an
exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti]
and led, and can the shared life be realised which alone is a social force with
the creation of the “historical bloc” (Q 11, §67; SPN, p. 418).

Now this conception of the historical bloc points to something
more complex than the formation of the people by means of a
process of signification that creates both a common identity and an
opposition to a common ‘enemy’, however important such aspects
are for this re-emergence of the people as the collective agent of
transformation and emancipation. When dealing with the particular
problems posed by the need to create new forms of popular unity
between the different segments of the subaltern classes and groups
divided as they are by ethnic or religious lines, but also by the
institutional division between citizens and migrants as well as
undocumented migrants, more important than the common
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‘cultural referents’ are the collective practices, demands, strategies,
re-writings of histories, understandings of each other, and – above
all – common aspirations, that can indeed induce the common
identification as people. This process also requires concrete
struggles for the institutional forms that enable this convergence,
especially full social and political rights, but also the forms of
political organizing and mass political intellectuality that link this
common condition to common hegemonic projects of
transformation and emancipation and help the articulation of
common struggles and alliances. In sum, it is what Gramsci tried to
define as the “Modern Prince”, the political form of a modern
United Front.
Moreover, the people are not just a ‘discursive’ construction, in
the sense of an arbitrary articulation of disparate elements into a
temporary form of coherence. Our conception of the people in
based upon class analysis and the potential for alliances of the
subaltern classes. Following Poulantzas we can say the people is a
“concept for strategy”,13 that today points to the direction of an
actual social alliance, formed as a result of the evolution of the
contemporary forms of capitalist accumulation that create
‘objective’ material conditions that bring together working class
strata with new petty bourgeois strata (in the Poulantzian sense),
state employees and even segments of the traditional pettybourgeois strata as a result of the inability of contemporary
neoliberal policies to enhance a lasting historical bloc around
finance and multinational capitals, and the new forms of
precariousness, flexibility and over-exploitation that have been
intensified against both manual and intellectual labour. This indeed
creates common demands and interests, based upon the common
condition of labour, precariousness, unemployment, exploitation,
increased difficulty in dealing with basic needs that, in a certain
manner, unite the undocumented migrant with the young degree
holder moving from unemployment into precarious part-time work
13

“The articulation of the structural determination of classes and of class positions within a
social formation, the locus of existence of conjunctures, requires particular concepts. I shall
call these concepts of strategy, embracing in particular such phenomena as class polarization and
class alliance. Among these, on the side of the dominant classes, is the concept of the ‘power
bloc’, designating a specific alliance of dominant classes and fractions; also, on the side of the
dominated classes, the concept of the ‘people’, designating a specific alliance of these classes
and fractions.” (Poulantzas 1975, p. 24).
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and back into unemployment. Moreover, all these segments share
the same contradiction running through contemporary capitalism:
the fact that the contemporary labour force is at the same time
more precarious, more insecure, more subject to forms of systemic
violence, more fragmented, but also more in possession of those
intellectual and communicative skills to realize its role as producer
of social wealth and also to articulate demands and grievances (a
comparison between the communication strategies of modern
grass-root movements and certain aspects of the ingenuity of
collective resistances by refugees and undocumented migrants can
be really illuminating on this subject). Moreover, all these have also
taken actual collective forms of ‘encounters’ between the different
segments of a potential ‘people’ in contemporary movements.
Such a perspective poses important challenges regarding the
hegemonic aspects of such a strategy. They pose the need to
rethink the question of re-creating the collective subject of
emancipation to look directly at the traumas linked to oppression
and colonialism and to reconfigure, as Houria Bouteldja has
suggested, the ‘we’ of a new political identity to be collectively
invented.14 They require a certain encounter between different
currents, not only in the sense of political differences but also of
the differences created by the reproduction of the colonial
condition inside European States. Sadri Khiari posits this exigency
when he calls for the construction of a “decolonial majority, which
will be constituted by an alliance between indigenous political
forces and non-indigenous decolonial political forces” or when he
calls for a
politics of hegemony inside the French white population, a cultural, moral,
ideological politics in order to be, one day, conceivable that there are inside
the white political forces decolonial composing elements that will be based
upon a broad consensus inside the population (Bouteldja and Khiari (eds)
2012, p. 394).

14

“We are the sum of our acts of cowardice and of our resistances. We will be what we will
be worthy to be. That’s all. This is true for all of us, whites or blacks. It is there that the
question of the big WE will be posed. The We of our encounter, the We of the surpassing of
race and its abolition, the We of a new political identity that we must invent together, the We
of the decolonial majority. [...] This will be the We of a revolutionary love” (Bouteldja 2016,
pp. 139-140).
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In a like manner it is interesting to note his suggestions on how
the movements of what he defines as “indigenous” (namely the
former colonial subjects living as citizens or migrants in European
states) can contribute to the broader redefinition of movements of
emancipation.
[T]he French Indigenous but also non indigenous population suffers a
degradation not only of its economic conditions of life but also of its entire
life environment, a destruction of cultures, of popular knowledges, of
traditions, of citizenship, of many social links, problems that cannot be
resolved simply by the nationalisation of the means of production and by
planification, either statist or self-managed. To these questions, which are
complicated questions, I think that the indigenous are maybe more in position
than the left or the far left to find answers, to the extent that these are
questions that are being directly posed to them because they are the
fundamental forms of racialisation (Bouteldja and Khiari (eds.) 2012, 396-397).

And it is here that we find the importance of solidarity and
solidarity movements to refugees, especially forms that attempt to
create common spaces and practices of solidarity, such as selfmanaged forms of hospitality that combine an immediate answer to
a humanitarian crisis with struggles that treat refugees as collective
subjects and not simply ‘victims’. The example of the self-managed
Plaza Hotel in Athens and other self-managed centres that offer
forms of hospitality to refugees is one such example. The same
goes for all forms of common struggle across Europe, all attempts
to create new alliances based upon a common condition of
subalternity. From struggles for the rights of migrant labour to
initiatives such as the ‘March for Dignity’ in France, these are all
aspects of an attempt to ‘create people’.
It is also important to note that this conception of the people in
terms of a potential new “historical bloc”, in sharp contrast to both
a certain version of ‘multiculturalism’15 that treats societies as
simple aggregations of individuals and differences but also to the
neo-republican version of the people as common history and
shared values. It points to a people to be created, it accepts all the
referents of subaltern classes as necessarily contradictory elements
of a people to come, of a “national-popular” element that has yet
15

Especially since, as Himani Bannerji (2000) has suggested, a certain version of
multiculturalism can be fully compatible with neoliberalism.
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to be constructed, in a constant process of reconstruction /
reproduction / renewal. Above all, it is a conception of the
construction of the people that does not put class antagonism into
brackets: rather, it takes it as a starting point.
All this suggests that simply thinking about the rights of those
not included in the nation, however important this might be, is not
enough, because it does not challenge the current erosion of both
democracy and popular sovereignty as part of very specific social
and political strategies that enhance developments such as
European Integration. Moreover, an emphasis upon rights, without
a challenge of European Integration can lead either to the fruitless
pursuit of inscribing those rights within the institutional framework
of ‘Fortress-Europe’, in a phase when the opposite is more
probable, or to various forms of compromises, such the current
distinctions between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’. And the answer to
this impasse cannot be the invocation of a utopian ‘global’ right to
nomadic movement – however important it is to guarantee full
social and political rights to anyone living and working in a country
– exactly because, as in the former case, it does not point to the
actual political forms than can account both for the defence of
these rights but also for the possibility to really struggle against
racism by creating the kind of antagonistic political body that
would re-signify both democracy and social transformation. In
contrast, the choice of reclaiming popular sovereignty, in the form
of ruptures with international institutional forms that undermine
democracy, such as the EU and the Eurozone, along with
demanding full rights and citizenship for anyone living and
working in a country (and in general contributing to its collective
social life), indeed offers an alternative, creating conditions for a
broader process of trans-formation. It is exactly the prospect of
social transformation, a common future instead of a common
history or origin that creates a different antagonistic (and agonistic)
form of ‘popular unity’.16 In this sense, a renewed socialist
perspective, along the lines of such an emergence of a new
historical bloc, is both a potential outcome and a necessary
condition of dealing with the new forms of exclusion that emerge.
16

“Our politics must sidestep the paradigm of ‘unity’ based on ‘fragmentation or
integration’ and instead engage in struggles based on the genuine contradictions of our
society.” (Bannerji 2000, p. 120).
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And it is here that we can find the basis of a new inter-nationalism,
new forms of cooperation and solidarity. Solidarity inside a country
is the condition for solidarity abroad; a different social and political
configuration is the condition for a different ‘foreign policy’.
Consequently, it is exactly the emergence of a new historical bloc
than can actually give a different meaning to sovereignty, linking it
to social transformation and emancipation, basing it upon a
strategy to actually fight racism and neocolonialism and
transforming into a form of a potentially revolutionary ‘general
will’, representing the democratic instance that is at the heart of
communism as a material tendency.
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